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Whither Russell's Paradox of 
Predication?* 
NINO B .. COCCIHARELLA 
Indiana University 
Russell's paradox has two forms or versions, one in regard to 
the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, the other 
in regard to "the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predi­
cated of itself."l The first version is formulable in the ideography 
of Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and shows this system to be 
inconsistent. The second version, however, is not formulable in this 
ideography, as Frege himself pointed out in his reply to Russell.2 
Nevertheless, it is essentially the second version of his paradox that 
leads Russell to avoid it (and others of its ilk) through his theory of 
types. 
The first version is of course the relevant version with respect 
to any formulation of the theory of types in which membership in 
a class is the fundamental notion, that is, a formulation utilizing 
'£' as a primitive binary predicate constant.3 However, Russell's theory 
of types (even ignoring its ramification) is essentially concerned with 
the notion of predication, and only indirectly through the (philosophi­
cally questionable) interpretation of predication as the membership 
relation is the first version of his paradox relevant to this formulation. 
* The Author was partially supported in the research for this paper by NSF
grant GS-28605.
'"Letter to Frege," reprinted in [10], p. 125.
• "Letter to Russell," ibid., p. 128.
'Cf. (5), p. 140 for a specific formulation of this kind of type theory.
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Apparently, Russell saw his paradox as generating an aporetic 
situation in regard to two fundamental "notions," namely, the notion 
of membership (in a class) and the notion of predication (of an at­
tribute) .4 In regard to the notion of membership, the application of 
Russell's paradox is not here brought into question. However, in regard 
to the notion of predication, the applicability of the reasoning ground­
ing Russell's paradox will here be very much brought into question. 
Indeed, I shall claim that in this case the paradox fails.5 
Paradoxical reasoning, of course, is inapplicable within any "rea­
sonable" system, since an inconsistent system is eo ipso "unreason­
able." That is not the point. Rather, it is that the original context 
of the reasoning grounding Russell's paradox of membership involved 
deep metaphysical assumptions, some logical, such as the principle 
of excluded middle, and some ontological, namely the comprehension 
principle for sets, which really arc collectively inconsistent. The joint 
inconsistency of these assumptions does indeed constitute appropriate 
motivation for philosophical perplexity (aporia) regarding the notion 
of membership in that original context. On the other hand, the meta­
physical assumptions (especially in regard to the "nexus" of copula­
tion) of the original context supposedly grounding Russell's paradox 
of predication arc not, I shall want to argue, after all inconsistent; 
for once we rigorously specify the essential features of the original 
context within which the reasoning is supposedly codified, we shall 
see that the reasoning involves a trivial violation of the restrictions 
imposed for the proper substitution of a formula for a predicate vari­
able in the specification law for predicate variables. These restrictions, 
I shall argue, arc essential not because they preserve consistency­
which would be an ad hoc justification, a charge, I believe, that it 
is appropriate to make against the theory of types with its restrictions 
on grammatical wcll-formedness-but rather because they are the 
intuitively natural and appropriate restrictions to make when we are 
dealing with the notion of predication as opposed to that of member­
ship. (It is assumed throughout that these two "notions" are not 
the same.) The "loosening" of these restrictions required to "validate" 
'Godel (cf. [6], p. 13lf.) distinguishes these two forms of Russell's paradox by 
referring to them as the "extensional" and the "intensional" forms, respectively. 
For the purposes of the present paper, this distinction is preferable to Ramsey's 
different but better known distinction between "logical" and "semantical" 
paradoxes. 
'With this failure of course goes a primary if not sole motivation for the 
simple theory of ontological types of third and higher order. The ontological 
scheme of second-order logic remains unaffected, having as it docs a natural 
motivation of its own. Ramification also has its own motivation, and it may 
be appended to second-order logic (cf. [2], §58.) even though historically 
it was first appended to the simple theory of types. 
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(though not with syntactical considerations alone) since it is within 
a syntactical formulation of the logical context that the paradox is 
to be derived. 
Now, although second-order logic is essentially incomplete, there 
exist formulations which arc at least complete in a secondary sense 
and within the relevant extension of which Russell's paradox should 
be derivable if it is derivable at all within the intended logical context. 
Consider, for example, Church's formulation of the pure functional 
calculus of second order.1° For convenience I shall refer to this calculus 
as the system T. Our question now is: How is T to be extended 
to a system T" which can be construed as an adequate syntactical 
representative of the type of logical context in which Russell's paradox 
of predication is formulable? 
Obviously, a minimum requirement for the relevant extension 
of T is that we extend the notion of (well-formed) formula to allow 
predicate variables to occupy subject (or nominal) positions as well 
as predicate positions-for how otherwise could we represent "the 
predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself"? 
Our grammar is specified as follows. We shall assume that there 
are enumerably infinite and pairwise disjoint sets of variables: indi­
vidual variables and, for each natural number n, n-place predicate 
variables. (Propositional variables are 0-place predicate variables.) 
We shall use 'a', '{3', '-y ' to refer to individual variables, also called sub­
ject terms, and '1r', 'p', 'u', 'r' to refer to predicate variables (of arbitrary 
many places), also called predicate terms. We understand a term to be 
either an individual variable (subject term) or a predicate variable 
(predicate term). We shall use 'µ', '11' to refer to terms. As logical par­
ticles we shall use"-', the negation sign,---,, the conditional sign, and/\, 
the universal quantifier. Other logical particles, such as -, the bicon­
ditional sign, and V, the existential quantifier, are assumed to be 
defined (as syntactical abbreviations in the metalanguage) in the 
usual manner. An atomic formula is, for some natural number, n, the 
result of applying an n-place predicate variable 1r to n terms µo, ... , 
µn-1 :1r(µo, ... , µn_1). If n = 0, this result is understood to be 1r 
itself. (Observe that though a predicate term is not a subject term, a 
predicate term may occupy a subject position in an atomic formula. 
on a par with Russell's proposal of type theory. (And so too is my own 
preferred view disallowing predicate variables in subject or nominal positions!) 
That is, such a proposal amounts to a replacement of the original type of 
logical context to which the paradox of predication supposedly is applicable. 
Our present concern is not the evaluation of alternatives to this type of 
context but rather a clarification of its characterization and a reassessment 
of the reasoning supposedly grounding the paradox of predication within it. 
[2], Chapter V. In what is to follow, we shall use a notational style variant
to Church's. 
NINO B. COCCHIARELLA 137 
A subject term, on the other hand, is not allowed to occupy a predicate 
position.) A formula is any member of the intersection of those sets K 
containing the atomic formulas and such that ,-...,'P, ('P - y;), /\µtp are 
in K whenever 'P, y; are in K and µ is an individual or predicate variable. 
We shall use ''P', 'f', 'x' to refer to formulas. Bondage and freedom of 
(occurrences of) variables is understood in the usual manner. 
We now have the grammatical context for Russell's paradox of 
predication. Before specifying the transformational context, T*, let 
us review the informal reasoning grounding the paradox. We quote 
Russell: 
Let w be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated 
of itself. Can w be predicated of itself? From each answer its 
opposite follows. Therefore we · must conclude that w is not a 
predicate.11 
We paraphrase Russell in preferring 'property' to 'predicate'. The 
statements that there exists and that there does not exist such a prop­
erty as described by Russell are formulated within the present gram­
mar by 
(A) Vr/\1r[r(1r) - ,-...,1r(1r)]
(B) ,-...,Vr/\1r[r(1r) - ,-...,1r(1r)]
respectively, where r, 'Tr are distinct 1-place predicate variables. The 
presumed argument for expression (B) with respect to the yet-to-be 
specified transformational system T* seems to be the following: 12 
by special specification law for predicate variables; 
by sentential logic; 
(3) J'r- ,...,_, /\1r[r(1r) - ,-...,1r(1r)]
by (1), (2) and sentential logic; 
(4) j'r- /\ r ,-..., /\1r[r(1r) - ,-...,1r(1r)] 
11 Op. cit.
12 We indicate that q, is a theorem of T* by writing 'if- q,'. By a theorem of T* we
understand any formula terminating a finite sequence of formulas, where each 
constituent of the sequence is either an axiom of T* or is obtained from preceed­
ing constituents by one of the inference rules of T*. 
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predicate variables. Where p.., v are variables, whether of the same
type or not, we take 
to be tho result of replacing each free occurrence of p.. m cp by a
free occurence of v, if such a formula exists; otherwise 
is understood to be cp itself. The special specification axiom replacing
+509 of T is now formulated as: 
(A5) /\µcp -t rp [:]
where µ, v are variables of the same type.
By tho reasoning in (1) through (5) above, we conclude that
so far as T* is concerned, "the Russell property" does not exist:
II 
THE NONDEFINADILlTY OF "THE RUSSELL PROPERTY" 
Lot us now consider (A), tho sentence of T" affirming the existence
of "tho Russell property." We note first that tho truth of (A) is affirmed
by Russell through a simple specification of "the predicate: to be
a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself."14 Most writers on
the paradox construe such a specification to be a definition in the
object language of a (1-placo) predicate constant t, read 'is
improdicable'15: 
Since definitions when construed other than as syntactical abbrevia­
tions in the metalanguage amount to additional axioms, expression
(C) as an axiom added to T* yields: 
1-1 Throughout we ignore Russell's use of the modal 'cannot (be)' and read 
'is not' in its place. Even were the modal to be distinguished through extending 
T* to include modality, the same issue of trivial violation of proper substitution 
remains. 
"Cf. Carnap [1], p. 83 and Hilbert and Ackermann [8], p. 115. 
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from which (A) follows by existential generalization. Existential gen­
eralization here amounts to extending the special specification axiom 
(A5) to a form (A5') which allows specification to constants of the 
same type as the generalized predicate variable. It would seem then 
that the reasoning supposedly grounding expression (A) is to be 
viewed as being codified within that portion of T* described so far 
in Section 1 [ with the replacement of (A5) by (A5') ], which we 
shall call T0 *, plus the so-called "definitional" axiom (C): 
by special specification axiom (A5'); 
by "definition" (C) and generalization; and therefore 
that is, 
/T,•+ccYT/\11'[T(11') +--t 1'--'71'(7r)] 
by (a), (b) and sentential logic. 
But is (C) a legitimate definition; that is, is T0* + (C) really 
a definitional extension of T0*? One necessary condition for a defini­
tion is that it be noncreative, and in the present case this means 
that for any formula 'P in which the defined predicate constant t
does not occur, if 
'T*+<C> tp 
then 
IT,* tp 
Accordingly, if T0* + (C) really is a definitional extension of To*, 
then expression (A), as well as (B), is already provable in TO*, that 
is, To* is inconsistent. The following argument, however, shows to 
the contrary that TO* is consistent. Moreover, its consistency can 
be proved by the same "very elementary syntactical argument1116 
which proves the consistency of T, our present version of standard 
second-order logic. 
In the proof of consistency, we shall associate with each formula 
<p (of our present grammar) a wff /(<p) of the extended propositional 
10 [2]' p. 306. 
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calculus, that is, a wff of T in which occur no variables other than 
propositional (0-place predicate) variables. We observe that the ex­
tended propositional calculus is not only consistent but provides an 
effective test for validity.17 
We first characterize the following function g defined recursively 
on the set of formulas: 
(i) g(11'(µo, ... , µn-1)) = 71' 
where 11'(µo, ••. , µn-i) is an atomic formula 
(ii) g(r-v<p) = r-vg(<p)
(iii) g(<p- y;) = [g(<p) - g(y;)] 
(iv) g(/\a<p) = g(<p)
where a is an individual variable 
where 71' is a predicate variable 
Observe that g assigns to each formula an expression which con­
sists only of logical particles and predicate variables. Now since the 
set of predicate variables is equinumerous with its proper subset of 
propositional variables (both being of cardinality No), we have a one­
to-one function * correlating different propositional variables with 
different predicate variables. We define recursively the function h, the 
domain of which is the range of g: 
where 71' is a predicate variable 
(ii) h(r-vl;) = r-vhW
(iii) h(I;- 0) = [h(/;) - h(O)]
(iv) h(/\11'/;) = /\71'*h(/;) 
We now take f to be the relative product g/h, that is, f(<p) =
h[g(<p)], for each formula <p. Quite obviously, if <p is an axiom of To*, 
then f(<p) is a valid formula of the extended propositional calculus. 
Moreover, each inference rule of T0* is easily seen to preserve validity 
under the transformation f. Accordingly, if 
'T•* <p 
"Ibid. 
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then f(,p) is a valid wff of the extended propositional calculus. There­
fore, if T0* were inconsistent, then the extended propositional calculus 
would also be inconsistent, which it is not. Accordingly, 1'o* is con­
sistent after all. We conclude then that T0* + (C) is not a definitional 
extension of To*, that is, expression (C) cannot be construed as an 
innocuous definition. 
III 
TnE NoNCOMPHEHENSIDILI'l'Y OF "THE RusSELL PnoPEHTY" 
Why should it ever have been thought that expression (C), or 
its closure (D), was a legitimate definitional form? More specifically, 
at least relative to our present context, where t is a (I-place) predicate 
constant and 'I' is a formula in which t docs not occur and whose 
only free variable is µ, what arc the exact conditions under which 
the formula 
(E) t(µ) - ,p 
(or its closure) can be legitimately construed as a definition (relative 
to T*), that is, under what necessary and suflicient conditions can 
T* + (E) be construed as a definitional extension of T*? Obviously, 
T* + (E) is a definitional extension of T* when and only when 
IT* VrJ\µ[r(µ) - ,p] 
where r is a 1-placc predicate variable distinct from µ and not occur­
ring free in cp. Accordingly, it is not the so-called "definition" (C) 
of "the Russell property" which shows (A) to be provable in T*.
Rather conversely, it is the provability of (A) in T* which would 
show that (C) can reasonably be construed within the type of logical 
context in question as a definition of a property, specifically "the 
Russell property." 
Of course, if T*, our representative of the type of logical context 
in question, were inconsistent, then (A) would be provable in it and 
therefore (C), relative to T*, would be an "acceptable" definition. 
Moreover, since T0 «· is a fragmcnt 1 8 of T''", (D) is provable in T"; 
and, accordingly, were we to assume (A) as an axiom of T*, we 
would immediately have its inconsistency. Dut there is simply no 
"According to the observations made in Section I, T* is to be an extension 
of T. But T contains as theorems instances of the comprehension principle 
for complex properties and these arc not provable in T,*. Their provability in T 
requires the general specification laws *50!), and *50!),. (op. cit., p. 207), an<l for 
these laws some account has yet to be given. 
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point in assuming the context to be inconsistent only to show that 
a paradox is provable within it. The logical context of the reasoning 
supposedly grounding Russell's paradox of predication cannot be based 
simply on the assumption of (A) as an axiom-not at least without 
surrendering its philosophical significance-unless that assumption is 
a consequence of a more general principle comprehending the condi­
tions under which a formula is understood to "determine" or "repre­
sent" a property. Clearly, the correct characterization of such a princi­
ple is the central difficulty in the specification of the system T*. 
We note that in regard to the system T, standard second-order 
logic, such a principle has already been appropriately characterized. 
Specifically, it is the principle which concerns the conditions under 
which a formula may be construed as a substituend of a generalized 
predicate variable. For, as, and only as, such a substitucnd does 
it "represent" a value of that predicate variable. Accordingly, it is 
the general specification law for predicate variables which compre­
hends the conditions under which a formula is understood to "deter­
mine" or "represent" a property. For the wffs of T, the law is schema­
tized as: 
where 7f' is an n-place predicate variable and ao, ... , cxn-1 arc distinct 
individual variables.19 Note that from this axiom schema we are able
to derive the comprehension principle for properties. For since 
where 1r is not free in cp, then 
by the general specification axiom for predicate variables, and there­
fore: 
The question now is: How are we to extend in an intuitive and 
natural way the notion of the proper substitution of a formula for 
a predicate variable so that we can apply the notion to all formulas 
as well as the wffs of T? Needless to say, the extension of this notion 
is not to violate the distinguishing feature of predication as reflected 
'"Cf. [2], p. 297. 
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by our grammar, namely, the distinction between subject positions
on the one hand and predicate positions on the other. To nullify
this distinction by construing predicate positions as "argument" posi­
tions on a par with subject positions is to depart from predication
as our central concept and to turn rather to membership or a member­
ship type of relation. 20 
Because of notational differences, we paraphrase rather than di­
rectly quote Church's definition of substitution for T.21 In doing so,
however, we shall understand 
cp [
µo · • · µn-1
]Po • • • Pn-1 
to be the result of simultaneously replacing all the free occurrences of
µo, ... , µn-1 in cp by free occurrences of Po, . . , Pn-1, respectively,
if such a formula exists; otherwise it is cp itself.
If 1r is an n-place predicate variable and a0, • , an-1 are distinct
individual variables, then
shall be If unless the following conditions are satisfied: (I) no free
occurrence of 1r (in predicate position) in If occurs within a subformula
of If of the form /\µx, where µ is a predicate or individual variable
distinct from ao, . . . , an-I and occurring free in cp; and (2) for all
individual variables (30, ... , f3n-i, if 1r(/30, . . . , f3n-1) occurs in If
in such a way that the occurrence of 1r is a free occurrence, then for
each i < n, there is no subformula of cp of the form /\f3;x in which a;
has a free occurrence. If these two conditions are satisfied, then
is the result of replacing, for arbitrary individual variables f3o, ... ,
/3n-1, each occurrence of 1r(f30, • • , f3n-i) in If at which 1r is free by an
occurrence of 
[ao, ... , <Xn-1] cp f3o, • . . , f3n-l •
If we extend this notion of substitution so that it applies to
our broader notion of what a formula is, we observe that clause (1)
•• What Grossmann (op. cit) calls "exemplification" is an example of such u
membership type of relation.
21 Op. cit., p. 192 f.
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remains quite appropriate as it is and requires no addition. Clause
(2), to the contrary, does. We replace clause (2) by:
(2') for all terms (predicate or individual variables) µ0, • • • , 
µn-1, if 1r(µo, . . . , µn-1) occurs in if; in such a way that the
occurrence of 1r is a free occurrence, then for each i < n,
there is no subformula of 'P of the form /\µ;x in which a; has
a free occurrence. 
When conditions (1) and (2') are satisfied, we take the substitution
to be the result of replacing, for arbitrary terms (predicate or individual
variables) µo, . . . , µn-1, each occurrence of 1r(µ0, ... , µn-1) in if; at
which 1r is free by an occurrence of 
'P [
ao, ... , CYn-1] 
µo, • • • , µn-1 .
We observe that the restrictions regarding proper substitution,
that is, the two restrictions, (1) and (2'), are required in order to
avoid a "clash" of bound and free variables. The first restriction
makes the reasonable demand that other than the indicated subject
terms ao, ... , an-i, no variable free in 'P, the substituend, is to become
bound upon the substitution of 'P (relative to the subject terms
ao, ... , an-1) for 1r in If· This restriction is already essential even
for standard second-order logic. The second restriction, however, re­
quires that no subject or predicate term occupying, say, the kth sub-
ject position of a free occurrence of 1r in If becomes bound when
that term replaces a free occurrence in 'P of its associated subject
term ak, That this restriction should apply to predicate as well as
subject terms occupying subject or "argument" positions of a free
occurrence of 1r is a natural requirement, once we allow predicate
terms to occupy subject positions. The restrictions then are quite in
order. 
Accordingly, we replace axioms *5090 and *509n of T by a single
axiom schema: 
(A6) 
where 1r is a n-place predicate variable and a0, • • • , an-1 are distinct
individual variables 
We have now accounted for and replaced every axiom (and in­
ference rule) of T by an analogue appropriate to all the formulas
and not just the wffs of T. The system resulting from T by this
replacement is T0* + (AG). The question now is: Is To*+ (A6) an
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adequate syntactical representative of the logical context within which 
the reasoning supposedly grounding Russell's paradox of predication 
is to be represented? That is, is T* = TO* + (A6)? 
In evaluating this question, let us note that the notation: 
is not defined when a0, • . . , an-l are not all of them ( distinct) free 
subject terms (individual variables) of <P· 22 In other words, predicate 
terms are not allowed to indicate the "argument" positions of our 
formula substituends. 
In order to see why this should be so within the context in ques­
tion consider the attempt to prove (A), the formula of T* affirming 
the existence of "the Russell property," in a manner analogous to our 
proof above of the comprehension principle in T for properties. If
we were to grant the initial step of this proof, namely, 
then expression (A) would follow as a trivial consequence. It is quite 
obvious, of course, that this initial step cannot be justified by (A5) 
since the substitution of '"''"lf' for r in ,....._,J\7r[r(7r) <----> ,....._,7r(7r)] results in 
replacing a free occurrence of r by a bound occurrence of 71". In addition, 
of course, (A5) applies only to terms and ,....._,71" is not a term. The rele­
vant law here, if any, is not (A5) but (AG), where supposedly we are to 
substitute ,....._,7r(a) for r. But 
22 This is not entirely correct in that ao, .•• , an_,, on the definition given, arc
not required to even occur no less occur free in 'P· This, however, is merely a
matter of logical economy. For in place of 'P we can always put ('PA ao = ao A
• • • A an-1 = an_,) and then interchange (as based on provable equivalence) 
in the substitution result all occurrences of 
( _ _ ) [ ao 
· · · <Xn-1]A ao - ao A • • • A <Xn-1 - lYn-1 µo · • · µn-1 
that replaced an occurrence of 1r(µ0, ... , µn_,) in ,ft by
[ ao · · · an-I] 
'P µo · · · µn-1 
Identity is understood to be defined as follows:
µ = v = df A u[u(µ) +--> u(v)] 
where u is the first 1-place predicate variable distinct from µ and v. 
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is not identical with ,--...,J\-,r[,,..__,11"(1r) - ,,..__,71"(11")], for 71" occurs free in "-'7l"(a) 
but becomes bound in the replacement of r(11") by 
in the formula ,,..__,/\7l"[r(11") - ,,..__,71"(11")]. In this case we have a violation 
of our first restriction, namely, clause (1), which was designed to 
prevent just such a "clash" of variables. However, because 71" is not a 
subject term (individual variable), even though in "-'71"(11") it occupies a 
subject position, we cannot construe the substitution to be: 
since substitution in this case is not defined. Note, however, that if it 
were defined, in this case we would have a conflict between the occur­
rence of 71" in the subject position and the occurrence of 71" in the predi­
cate position in ,,..__,71"(71"). For, intuitively the occurrence of 71" in the 
subject position would be allowed to become bound upon substitu­
tion, 23 whereas the occurrence of 71" in the predicate position would not.
The reason for this last claim is that the replacement of r(11") by "-'71"(11") 
by "substituting" "-'71"(11") for r in ,--...,/\7l"[r(11") - "-'71"(11")] would be the 
same replacement of r(11") by "-'71"(11") except by improperly substituting 
"-'7l"(a) for r in the same formula. The two substitutions do exactly 
the same job except that there is readily recognized to be a "clash" of 
variables in the one, and therefore this substitution is improper, but 
supposedly ('?) there is no "clash" of variables in the other, and there­
fore this substitution would be said to be proper. Indeed, this is 
essentially the point of our not defining substitution where the "argu­
ment" positions of the substituend are allowed to be occupied by 
predicate variables. Every substitution effected by allowing predicate 
terms to indicate the subject positions, construed as the "argument" 
positions of the substituend, can also be effected by allowing only 
subject terms to indicate these same "argument" positions. The real 
difference between the two is that, where some substitutions of the 
latter kind indicate a clear "clash" of variables and therefore are 
improper, their corresponding substitutions of the former kind fail to 
indicate the "clash" of variables involved and therefore would be 
unreasonably recognized as proper. The two substitutions do the same 
job, except that the one shows itself to be improper, whereas the other 
fails to do so. Our procedure has been to discriminate in favor of those 
23 Note that in the definition of substitution the vnriables indicating the "argu-
ment" positions in the substituend arc allowed to be bound in the formula 
resulting by proper substitution of that substituend. 
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that indicate "clashes" of variables that intuitively are really there in 
the logical context in question. 
Now I do not believe that our discrimination here is adventitious. 
There is, I should like to argue, an ontological basis for it. Further­
more, this basis is to be found in the ontological background implicit 
in the logical context in question. 
IV 
THE ONTOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSELL'S 
PARADOX OF PREDICATION 
In discussing the ontological background of T* let us note that 
within it there is an explicit ontological distinction being made analo­
gous to that of Aristotle's between primary and secondary being 
(ousia). Retaining this terminology somewhat, we shall call primary 
those "individuals" of the background ontology which can be a value 
of an individual variable but which cannot be a value of a predicate 
variable. The remaining "individuals" of the ontology we shall call 
secondary individuals. 
Now it may seem dubious to refer to the nonprimary individuals 
as "individuals" even if they are secondary. Propositions, properties, 
and attributes, in general, are not normally thought of as "individ­
uals." Propositions are the kind of entity that is asserted, denied, 
believed, known, conjectured (whether), and so on, in short the kind 
of entity that is represented only by a complete sentence or formula. 
Similarly, properties and attributes are the kind of entity that is 
predicated, ascribed, attributed, that is, the kind of entity that is 
represented only by predicate expressions (complex or otherwise). All 
this may be so, and the background ontology of T* agrees up to 
a point. What this ontology explicitly denies, however, is that proposi­
tions, properties, and attributes can be represented only by sentence 
and predicate forms, respectively. Propositional (0-place predicate) 
variables are allowed to occur not only in propositional contexts as 
whole formulas but also in subject or argument positions of predicate 
variables. Similarly, property (1-place predicate) variables and at­
tribute (n-place predicate) variables, in general, are allowed to occur 
not only in predicate positions but also in subject positions of them­
selves as well as of other predicates. Accordingly, predicate variables 
are being construed as substituends of individual variables, and the 
values of predicate variables are therefore also values of the individual 
variables. It is in this fact of the grammar we have constructed as 
a syntactical representative of this background ontology that we are 
confronted with an extension of the usual view of the nature of propo-
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sitions! properties, and attributes. Actually, however, it is more an 
extens10n of the notion of individuality: the characteristic of being 
that type of entity for which it is ontologically significant that it 
be a subject of predication, that is, that type of entity which can 
be referred to through the subject expressions of the sentences and 
formulas of the ontological language in question. 
Now it is a noteworthy fact of the constructed grammar that 
a proposition is entified qua proposition and that in general an n-ary 
attribute is entified qua being an n-ary attribute only through quanti­
fication binding distinct types of predicate variable, specifically 
0-place predicate variables for propositions and n-place predicate
variables for n-ary attributes. Consequently, implicit in the back­
ground ontology of T* is the assumption that what we have called
the secondary individuals do not form a unified ontological category
qua secondary individuals. Otherwise, the grammar should include
a generic type of predicate variable or some such logical element
designating or having as its values all and only the secondary indi­
viduals. Though less obvious, a similar observation applies to the
primary individuals.24 
However, what is also implicit in the background ontology is 
that the "individuals," the primary and secondary individuals to­
gether, do form just such a unified ontological category. This ontologi­
cal category is represented in our grammar by allowing any term 
to occupy any subject position of any predicate variable. The category 
of being of the values of terms that occupy subject positions is compre­
hended through quantification binding variables whose essential f ea­
ture is to represent and to represent no more than the being of a 
"subject," an individual. What we have called individual variables 
are exactly such variables as described. No external meaning-espe­
cially from the point of view of an ontology construed as an alterna­
tive to that grounding T*, for example, the point of view of the 
theory of types, which, at least for Russell, replaced the point of 
view of the ontology of T*-should be given to our use of 'individual' 
here. 
If this assessment of T*'s ontological background is correct, then 
the conditions under which a formula '-'determines" or "represents" 
an attribute, that is, the conditions under which the formula might 
be said to "define" an attribute must be conditions comprehending ' 
"Accordingly, the ontological content of our generic phrase .'sec�ndary in­dividual', as well as that of 'primary individual', is not expr�ss1ble m T*. Our
present perspective, however, is that of general metaphysics and we shall 
allow ourselves phraseology not permitted in the logistic system T* whose 
purpose is to be an adequate syntactical representative of the logical context 
to which supposedly Russell's paradox of predication is applicable. 
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all the individuals, both primary and secondary. Each attribute must 
result in a proposition when "applied" or attributed to any individual 
(or n-tuple of individuals if the attribute is n-ary). The resulting 
proposition will either be or not be the case, though it may be either 
on ontological grounds.25 In effect, the relevant "argument" positions 
of open formulas defining attributes must be occupied only by subject 
terms (individual variables). Thus "the Russell property," not being 
"determined" or "represented" by a definiens, which can be signifi­
cantly predicated in T�- of either primary individuals or secondary 
individuals other than properties, fails to exist as a property in the 
ontology of T*. 
Let us note that every proposition, property, or attribute which 
can be "determined" or "represented" by a formula of T* is so deter­
mined by the comprehension principle for attributes. This principle is 
already provable in T0* + (AG) in exactly the same manner described 
earlier for T; where cp is a formula and a0, . . . , an-l are all ( or even, 
only some of) the distinct incliviclual variables (.subject term.s) occurring 
free in cp (regardless of the order of their occurrence in cp), then 
(CP) JTo•+cAaJ V,rAao . . .  /\a,,_1[7r(ao, . .. , CXn-1) H cp) 
where 7r is an n-place predicate variable which does not occur free in cp. 
Observe that no instance of this comprehension principle can be 
construed as affirming the existence of "the Russell property." For, 
although an individual variable has all the properties among its values, 
the variable itself still cannot occupy a predicate position; that is, 
V7r/\a[7r(a) +---> ,.._,_,a(a)] is not a formula according to the grammar of the 
logical context in question. And the reason for this is precisely our 
respect for the distinction between predication and membership or 
any membernhip type of relation. Indeed, predication is not to be 
construed as a relation at all, and the singular way our present grammar 
has of expressing ("showing forth") this "ontological fact" is through 
distinguishing s'Ubject terrn.s (individual variables) from predicate tenns
(predicate variables) and by refusing to allow subject terms to occupy 
predicate positions. Were prediction to be misconstrued as being a 
relation, there would be no ontological point to the grammatical 
"For example, consider the property of being an n-nary attribute: 
wh�re 1r i� '.m n-place predicate variable and <J" is the first I-place predicate
v�nable d1stmct from 1r (in case n = 1). This property on ontological grounds
WIil be only falsely attributable to primary individuals or secondary individualB 
other than n-ary attributes. 
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distinctions we have made, and Russell's paradox of predication would
be but a "funny" way of expressing his paradox of membership. 26 
Finally, we may return to our original inquiry regarding whether
To* + (A6) is an adequate syntactical representative of the logical
context within which the reasoning supposedly grounding Russell's
paradox of predication is to be represented, that is, our inquiry
whether T* = TO* + (A6). 
Now, in so far as T0% + (A6) fails to fully express the ontological
fact of T* that every proposition, property, and attribute in general
is an individual of the background ontology, that is, that it is a
value of a bindable individual variable, our response here must be
in the negative. One way of supplementing TO* + (A6) with this
additional ontological content is by stipulating that whatever is true
of every individual is therefore true of every secondary individual
of any specifiable type as a value of a predicate variable of that
type: 
(A7) Ac«/J - A1r<1> [;]
where a is an individual variable and 1r is any predicate variable
which docs not occur in cf,. With the desired additional content ex­
pressed in this manner, we may finally identify T* as the system
To*+ (A6) + (A7). Russell's paradox of predication, of course, is
no longer derivable in its original form since that form involves, as
we have seen, a violation of the restrictions imposed for the proper
substitution of a formula for a predicate variable in the specification
law (A6). Nevertheless, these restrictions, I have argued, are in­
tuitively natural and appropriate from the perspective of the ontology
of the type of logical context in question. 
Incidentally, it is noteworthy to point out here that relative to
the fragment T0* + (A7), the comprehension principle (CP) and the
20 Predication as an ontological category amounts to what I have called the 
category of rnocles of copulation [3]. In the present grammar only two unary 
modes, misconstrued nominally as "truth" and "falsity," are represented, �he 
latter by ~, and the former by an implicit intcrpretati?n of t;ie concat?�ation 
factor between a predicate and its argument express10ns. ( fhc addition of 
a "modal" operator corresponding to the English 'It is true that' would be 
redundant here. Notice how this redundancy (and the redundancy of any 
finite iteration of such an operator) along with the view that 1m:dic'.1tion 
is not a relation answers Bradley's infinite regress argument for pred1cat10n I) 
Extensionalisls, of course, deny that there arc any unary modes of copulation 
other than truth and falsity and that all n-ary modes, for n > 1, arc truth­
functional (a thesis not being challenged in the present paper). Needless 
to say, truth and falsity so construed arc not to be confused with semantic
truth and falsity, the latter being properties of sentences (and dependent 
in their analysis on the former). 
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specification law (A6) for predicate variables determine the same 
logical conditions; that is, the systems TO* + (A6) + (A7) and 
To*+ (A7) + (CP) are equivalent. This shows that the relationship 
between the comprehension principle (CP) and the specification law 
(A6) is really about as intimate as I have indicated.27 
V 
THE CONSISTENCY OF T'� 
It may be thought that all of our formal reconstruction comes 
to naught, for do we not now have a variant of Russell's argument 
in which rather than "the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot 
be predicated of itself" we consider that property: to be an individual
which is identical (in the sense of having all properties in common) 
with a property which that individual does not have?28 The existence 
of such a property is guaranteed in the ontology of T* by the com­
prehension principle (CP): 
JJ.'i Vr!\a[r(a) - Vrr(a = 1r A ,.,._,1r(a))] 
where identity is understood to be as it is defined in footnote 22. 
"The equivalence can be shown in the manner indicated in [4] where it is 
proved that (CP) and (A6) as formulated for T, standard second-order logic. 
determine the same logical conditions relative to the remaining axioms of 
T. Moreover, by utilizing essentially the same arguments of [ 4) we can prove
T* to be equivalent to a substitution free axiomatization the only inference
rule of which is modus ponens. The axioms of this substitution free axiom
set are all (universal) generalizations of all instances of (Al) through (A3),
(OP), and formulas of the following forms (where identity is understood 
as defined in footnote 22) : 
/\µ. ( <f, -> t/t) -> ( /\µ. <f, ...... /\µ.ift) 
<f,-> /\µ<f, 
where µ is a predicate or individual variable which does not occur (free) in <f,, 
Vaµ= a 
where µ is a predicate or individual variable distinct from a, 
V1ro-= 7r 
where 1r, o- are distinct n-place predicate variables, 
µ = v-> (<f,-> t/t) 
where <f,, t/t are atomic formulas and t/t is obtained from <f, by replacing an occur­
rence of v in subject position by an occurrence of µ. • 
"This version of Russell's argument was first suggested to me by Professor 
Max Zorn. 
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We note that by (A7), that is, the thesis that every property 
is an individual, 
and therefore by generalization and distribution over a conditional 
of a universal into an existential quantifier: 
That is, within the ontology of T* there is a property which has 
itself if and only if it is identical with a property which it does 
not have: 
The claim that such a result is counterintuitive presupposes the 
principle that identical properties are co-extensive: 
For, by (Id*), any property identical with a property which it does 
not have eo ipso does not have itself. That is, since 
\T•+crd•> T = 1r - [r(r) - 1r(r)] 
by (Id*), (A5), and (A7), then 
by generalization, (A4) and sentential logic. 
But within T", by law (A5), any property which possesses every 
property with which it is identical therefore possesses itself: 
and therefore by contraposition 
29 
20 We might note as an incidental consequence of this last theorem that the prop­
erty of being an individual identical with a property which that individual does 
not have is a property which possesses itself; and therefore since, by (CP), this 
property exists in T*, we have VTT(r) as a theorem of T*. 
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Accordingly, given (Id*), a property is identical with a property 
which it does not have if and only if that property does not have 
itself: 
And therefore, by sentential logic, generalization, and quantifier nega­
tion, within T* + (Id*) there is no property which has itself if and 
only if it is identical with a property which it does not have: 
But, as I have shown above, there is such a property within T* and 
therefore also within T* + (Id*). Consequently, T* + (Id*) is incon­
sistent. Or, equivalently, (~Id*) is a theorem of T*.30 
Although such a result is contradictory within the ontological 
framework of type theory, it really is very much in accordance with the 
ontological framework of T*, at least in regard to some of its con­
sequences. For according to the ontological background of T*, predi­
cation is not a relation, and within T* this significant ontological 
fact is actually implied by (,._,Id*). The proof is as follows, where 
"-'Vp/\,rAa[p(1r, a) - 1r(a)], since it denies the existence of any relation 
which is coextensive with predication, is understood to express in T* 
the ontological fact that predication is not a relation. We have first 
by (A6): 
that is, 
and therefore 
11'- 7r = T-+ Aa[p(1r, a) - p(r, a)] 
by generalization, (A4), and sentential logic; but then 
1 '- A1rAa[p(1r, a) - 1r(a)]-+ (1r = r -➔ Aa[1r(a) - r(a)]) 
"A . ·1 
. simi ar argument applies to relations of arbitrary many places. For example,
m the case of a binary relation (CP) guarantees 
/T' Vp/\a/\f)[p(a, f)) +-+ Vu(a = u A ~u(a, fJ))]
But with Id* extended to apply to binary relations as well-call it Ido*-we 
can sho� that no such relation exists in T* + (Id,*) and, accordingly·, that 
(~Id,*) 1s a theorem of T*. 
It. is !1oteworthy, however, that apparently Id.*, for each natural numbern, IS 11sprovable in T* only for (n-ary) attributes of a rather peculiarly "self­
reflex1ve" and impredicative kind. 
NINO B. COCCIIIAREJLLA 155 
by (A5) and elementary quantificational logic, and therefore 
[
'F-
/\p/\1r/\a[p(1r, a) - 1r(a)] - (Id*) 
by generalization, distribution over a conditional of a universal into 
an existential quantifier, and deletion of a vacuous quantifier. But 
since (~Id*) is a theorem of T*, it follows that 
Aside from yielding such desirable consequences as the above 
and thereby being of positive significance to T\ the claim that 
(~Id*) cannot consistently be a theorem of T* is simply false. For 
the consistency of T* is easily shown by the same "very elementary 
syntactical nrgument" which proves the consistency of T and which 
earlier we utilized to prove the consistency of TO*. And this is the 
case because, by definition of the transformation of any formula of T"· 
into a formula of the extended propositional calculus, the transform 
of any instance of (A7), being a conditional whose consequent is 
a vacuous quantification of its antecedent, clearly results in a valid 
formula. Similarly, the transform of any instance of the comprehension 
principle for T* results in an instance of the comprehension principle for the extended propositional calculus; and therefore To''+ (A7) + 
(CP) is consistent. But, because this system is equivalent to T", it 
follows that T" is consistcnt.32 
In addition, we might note that the following version of the axiom 
of choice is formulable in T*: 
(AC*) /\aV1r¢- V /\aS"</3,, .. ,,p,,_,) ¢ I P p(a,{Jo, . .. , /311-IJ 
31 A similar argument utilizing (Idn *) shows that ~V p/\rr/\ao . • • /\an-1 
[p(rr, ao, ... , Dln-i) +-> rr(ao, ... , Oln-i)] is a theorem of T*. 
32 Without going through the consistency of the equivalent system To*+ (A7) + 
(CP), a more direct proof of T*'s consistency utilizes the lemma that if 
then 
This lemma is proved by a simple inductive argument on the structure of 
¢. From this lemma it follows that the transform of any instance of (A6) 
is an instance of the general specification law of the extended propositional 
calculus. 
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where a, {30, • • •  , /3n-i are distinct individual variables, 71" is an 
n-place predicate variable, p is an (n + 1 )-place predicate variable,
and cf, contains no bound occurrences of either p or a.33 
Furthermore, since the transformation into the extended proposi­
tional calculus of the antecedent of any instance of (AC*) differs 
from the transformation of its consequent by an alphabetic change 
of a bound propositional variable, it follows that the transform of 
such an instance is valid ; and therefore T* + (AC*) is consistent, 
but again proved to be so within a decidable fragment of elementary 
syntax. 
In regard, however, to the addition to T* (or T* + (AC*)) of 
an axiom of infinity, such as 
(inf) V,r(AaV/J,r(a, /3) /\ Aa ,.__, 'IT"(a, a) /\ AaA/31\-y['Tr(a, /3) /\ 'Tr(/3, 'Y) 
-t 11"(a, -y)]) 
the situation is somewhat different. For the negation of the transform 
of (inf) is valid in the extended propositional calculus. Therefore, 
T* + (~inf), with or without (AC*), is consistent; that is, (inf) 
is not provable in T*, with or without (AC*). Consequently, establish­
ing the consistency of T* + (inf) requires a different type of proof. 
VI 
T* IS A CONSERVATIVE EXTENSION OF T 
One significant syntactical difference between (inf) and (AC*) 
is that the former but not all instances of the latter is a wff of T, 
and T + (inf), as is well-known, is consistent. Accordingly, to show 
that T* + (inf) is consistent it more than suffices to show that T* 
is a conservative extension of T, that is, that any theorem of T* 
which is a wff of T is already a theorem of T. For in that case, 
if T* + (inf) were inconsistent, then ( ~inf) would be a theorem 
of T* and therefore a theorem of T, which, by the existence of 
finite models of T, we know it not to be. Such an argument shows, 
of course, the much stronger result that any wff of T which is con­
sistent in T is therefore a formula which is consistent in T*.84 
We note first that the cardinality of the set of terms of T*, that is, 
of the set of all predicate and individual variables together, is NoNo, 
"Cf. [2], p. 131. 
"The argument that T* is a conservative extension of T was communicated 
to me by my colleagues Robert Meyer and Max Zorn independent of each 
other. 
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which by infinite cardinal arithmetic is No, and, accordingly, there
exists a one-to-one correspondence between all the terms and the
individual variables. For convenience, let ii, where µ is a predicate or
individual variable, be the individual variable associated with µ under
such a one-to-one correspondence. We define recursively the function s
whose domain is the set of formulas of T* and whose value for any such
formula is a wff of T: 
(i) s(1r(µo, ... , µn-1)) = 1r(i10, ... , iln-1)
(ii) s(,...,q,) = ,.._,s(q,) 
(iii) s(<t>- if;) = (s(q,) - s(if;))
(iv) s(Aaq,) = Aas(q,) 
(v) s(/\1rq,) = Aif/\1rs(q,)
The claim now is that for any formula </>, if Ir </>, then 11' s(q,).
Obviously, if q, is an axiom of T* by (Al) though (A4), then s(q,) is an 
axiom of T for the same reason. In regard to (A5), we note that 
s ( Aa<t>- q, [;]) = (Aas(q,) - s(q,) [;])
s ( A1r<1>- q, [;]) = ( l\1rl\1rs(q,) -t s(q,) [;] [;])
and therefore the s transform of any instance of (A5) is clearly a
theorem of T by the specification laws of T. In regard to (A7), observe
that 
and therefore the s transform of any instance of (A7) is a theorem
of T by the rule of alphabetic change of bound individual variables
and the insertion of a vacuous quantifier phrase. Finally, since 
s(V1rAao ... Aan-1[1r(ao, ... , <Xn-1) - q,]) 
= V1rV1rAao ... Aan-1
[1r(ao, ... , ?in-1) - s(q,)]
then the s transform of any instance of (CP) is an instance of the
comprehension principle of T prefixed by a vacuous quantifier on an
individual variable (since 1r does not occur free in q,); and therefore the
s transform of any instance of (CP) is a theorem of T. But because s
clearly preserves theoremhood in T under the inference rules of T*,
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and because T* is equivalent to T* + (A7) + (CP), then it follows 
that for every formula rp of T*, if IT• rp, then IT s(rp).35 
Finally, observe that if rp is a wff of T, then s( rp) is an alphabetic 
variant of rp with possibly the insertion of some vacuous quantifiers 
of the form Arr or Vrr ; and, accordingly, /T s(rp) if and only if /1, r/J. We 
conclude then that if rp is a wff of T and a theorem of T*, then r/J is
already a theorem of T. Consequently, T* + (inf) is consistent. 36 
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and therefore the s transform of any instance of (A6) is a theorem of T 
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'"We perhaps should point out that although T* + (AC*) and T* + (inf) have 
bot� _been shown to be consistent, the two proofs we have given cannotbe Jomcd to show that T* + (AC*) + (inf) is consistent. For as I pointed 
out above, (AC*) has instances that arc not wffs of T and unless we can 
show that such instances yield no more consequences i;1 T* than do those 
that arc wffs of T, the above proof does not suffice to establish the consistency 
of T* + (AC*) + (inf) relative to the consistency of T + (AC) + (inf). 
